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UNTIL THE PLENARY POWER DO US PART:
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT IN IMMIGRATION AFTER
FLORES-VILLAR
JESSICA PORTMESS∗
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) effectively bars a U.S. citizen from
sponsoring a foreign national same-sex spouse to immigrate to the United
States. The plenary power doctrine—a standard of extraordinary deference to
the political branches in immigration—may hinder judicial scrutiny of
DOMA in the immigration context. In the past two decades, and most recently
in Flores-Villar v. United States, the Supreme Court has failed to establish
boundaries of judicial deference in immigration cases; however, dissents
throughout the Court’s plenary power case law illuminate possible limitations
on the doctrine’s scope.
This Comment argues that courts should adopt a limited substantive
framework that confines plenary power deference to four substantive areas of
immigration law: (1) admission, (2) removal, (3) naturalization, and (4)
immigration policy distinctions. When determining whether a case involves
one of these four substantive areas, courts should apply Justice O’Connor’s
logically prior standard set out in her dissent in Nguyen v. INS. Employing
this limited substantive framework and standard, DOMA is likely beyond the
scope of plenary power deference. This Comment concludes that DOMA
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should thus be subject to traditional standards of constitutional scrutiny even
in the immigration context.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite his fifteen-year relationship with a U.S. citizen,1 Paul
Wilson Dorman was facing deportation in early 2011 after the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of his immigrant
visa petition.2 Mr. Dorman, an Irish national who arrived in the
1. Editorial, Couple Without a Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2011, at A14.
2. See Julia Preston, Judge Gives Immigrant in Same-Sex Marriage a Reprieve from
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, at A12 (reporting that the BIA denied Mr.
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United States in 1996,3 joined in a civil union with his U.S. citizen,
same-sex partner in New Jersey in 2009.4 Mr. Dorman now seeks to
immigrate to the United States based on this relationship5— an
immigration benefit routinely extended to heterosexual couples.6 A
formidable obstacle currently stands in his way: the Defense of
Marriage Act7 (DOMA) precludes recognition of same-sex unions
when interpreting any congressional act or administrative
regulation.8 On April 26, 2011, however, Mr. Dorman’s case showed
a glimmer of hope when Attorney General Eric Holder vacated the
BIA’s decision ordering Mr. Dorman’s deportation.9 Attorney
General Holder remanded the case for the BIA to determine
“whether and how the constitutionality of DOMA [was] presented”
in Mr. Dorman’s case, and whether Mr. Dorman’s civil union could
provide relief from deportation notwithstanding DOMA’s federal
definition of marriage.10
Mr. Dorman’s experience is emblematic of the obstacles facing
same-sex partners seeking to immigrate to the United States based on
relationships with U.S. citizens. With six states and the District of
Columbia now issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and five
states recognizing same-sex civil unions,11 DOMA affects an estimated
Dorman’s petition because his same-sex relationship was not recognized under
DOMA).
3. Editorial, supra note 1.
4. Preston, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their
Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 537, 546 (2010) (explaining that most foreign nationals are permitted to
immigrate on the basis of family unity).
7. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
8. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “marriage” as “only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife”); see also Suzanne Gamboa, Holder
Intervenes in Gay Man’s Deportation Case, SEATTLE TIMES (May 5, 2011, 4:31 PM),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2014974446_apusgayimmigra
nts.html (stating that the BIA affirmed the deportation order against Paul Wilson
Dorman on the basis of DOMA, which prohibited recognition of the civil union with
his male partner).
9. See Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011) (remanding the case to the BIA
to decide the merits notwithstanding DOMA’s federal definition of marriage).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Ill. Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP
STAT. 75/10 (2012) (defining “civil union” as a “legal relationship between 2
persons” regardless of sex); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009)
(declaring the bar on same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Iowa Constitution); Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Act
and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriageoverview.aspx (last updated June 2012) (identifying Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia as states
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35,000 U.S. citizens whose foreign national same-sex partners cannot
use their relationship to remain in the United States.12 The executive
branch, however, has recently indicated that it will no longer defend
DOMA in the courtroom,13 and binational same-sex couples are
seeing similar glimmers of hope in immigration cases across the
country.14
While Attorney General Holder’s decision may signal a step
towards recognizing same-sex marriages in the immigration context,
the Obama administration has far from abandoned its duty to
enforce DOMA.15 At the same time that Attorney General Holder
proclaimed in a February 2011 letter to Congress that the executive
branch will no longer defend DOMA in the courts, he confirmed the
commitment to enforce DOMA at the administrative agency level,16
which includes agency adjudication of immigrant visa petitions. Until
DOMA is repealed or a challenge to its application in immigration
cases succeeds in court, it will continue to effectively bar same-sex
partners from immigrating on the basis of relationships with U.S.
citizens.17 With courts uncertain of how Congress’s immigration and
that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New
Jersey, and Rhode Island as states that allow civil unions between same-sex couples).
12. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 540 (stating that this estimate reflects the number
of U.S. citizens living in the United States with foreign national same-sex partners).
13. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter
from Att’y Gen.], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag223.html (concluding that DOMA fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the
standard the executive branch argues should apply to classifications based on sexual
orientation).
14. See Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, (June 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/
us/30immig.html (describing the cancellation of the deportation of a foreign
national who was denied legal residency as the spouse of a U.S. citizen because of
DOMA).
15. See generally Julia Preston, Justice Dept. to Continue Policy Against Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A15 (explaining that according to the Attorney
General’s spokesperson, Attorney General Holder intervened in the Dorman case to
compel the BIA to “decide issues he felt had been overlooked,” but the executive
will continue to enforce DOMA); Amy Taxin, Green Cards for Gay Couples?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2011, 1:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/06/06/green-cards-for-gay-couples_n_871818.html (reporting that in the wake
of the Attorney General’s intervention in the Dorman case, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement has vowed to enforce DOMA until the law is repealed or struck down
by the courts, leaving same-sex couples confused about what to expect in the
immigration process). But see Gamboa, supra note 8 (reporting that some, like
Dorman’s attorney, view the Attorney General’s intervention as a “far-reaching
victory” and evidence of the Obama administration’s “commitment to nullify”
DOMA).
16. Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13.
17. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 541 (stating that DOMA has “closed the door to
same-sex marriage recognition under the [Immigration and Nationality Act] for
now”). The Immigration and Nationality Act is the primary legislation that governs
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naturalization authority influences judicial scrutiny of DOMA in
immigration cases, these cases are excluded from the dialogue on
DOMA’s constitutionality.18
For over a century, the Supreme Court has understood Congress to
have “absolute and unqualified” power in immigration.19 The Court
has historically interpreted this “plenary power” to limit judicial
review of immigration statutes and has created diluted standards of
constitutional analysis in deference to Congress.20 In recent decades,
the Court has consistently avoided confronting the plenary power
doctrine directly.21 The Court most recently deflected the question
of the doctrine’s modern boundaries with its decision in Flores-Villar v.
United States,22 affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s deference to Congress and refusing to clarify the standard of
scrutiny that applies in challenges to immigration statutes.23 Mr.
Dorman’s case and similar cases challenging DOMA’s application in
immigration provide the latest opportunity for lower courts to clarify
the relationship between judicial scrutiny of DOMA and Congress’s
plenary power in immigration. Lower courts would benefit from the
Supreme Court’s guidance in questions as to the scope of the plenary
power doctrine —guidance the Court failed to provide in FloresU.S. immigration and citizenship. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA) Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182–87 (1952) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).
18. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 544 n.15 (questioning whether DOMA’s federal
definition of marriage applies to immigration through Congress’s plenary power).
But see Jordana Lynne Mosten, Note, Imagining Immigration Without DOMA, 21 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 384 (2010) (assuming that Congress’s authority to exclude samesex spouses “is not open to legal challenge” because Congress can bar same-sex
immigration through DOMA due to the plenary power doctrine).
19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (describing
Congress’s “absolute and unqualified” power to prohibit the entrance of or to expel
foreigners).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (defining the plenary power doctrine as the recognition of the
political branches’ long-established power to expel or exclude aliens free from
judicial control); see also infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the deferential standards applied
in immigration cases that are otherwise foreign to traditional constitutional analysis).
21. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001) (concluding that it was unnecessary
to determine whether a lesser degree of scrutiny was warranted by Congress’s plenary
power because the statute in question satisfied the appropriate level of scrutiny);
Miller, 523 U.S. at 432 (narrowing the constitutional question before the Court to the
extent that the Court did not need to consider the plenary power doctrine’s
influence on the extent of judicial review).
22. 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam). The Flores-Villar Court affirmed the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to dismiss an inquiry of the
appropriate level of scrutiny in matters of immigration and citizenship because the
statute in question satisfied intermediate scrutiny. Id.
23. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing a series of immigration cases where the
Supreme Court avoided clarifying the plenary power doctrine’s boundaries,
including the Court’s most recent decision in Flores-Villar).
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Villar24 or with its denial of certiorari in the similar case of Johnson v.
Whitehead.25 This Comment argues that the plenary power doctrine
should be limited in scope to questions of admission, removal,
naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions and that Congress
did not enact DOMA using its plenary power because DOMA does
not fit within this limited substantive framework. Thus, plenary
power deference cannot shield DOMA from traditional constitutional
standards of scrutiny because Congress did not use its immigration
power to enact DOMA.
Part I analyzes the plenary power precedent and the evolution of
that power throughout the history of the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the doctrine. This Part also discusses DOMA’s
application in the immigration context, particularly at the immigrant
visa petition stage, and how it serves as a practical bar to the
immigration of binational same-sex couples.26 Part II illuminates the
limits of the plenary power doctrine generally and proposes a limited
substantive framework that confines the doctrine’s scope to questions
of admission,27 removal,28 naturalization,29 and immigration policy

24. Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. at 2313 (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s deferential
standard without issuing an opinion).
25. American University, Washington College of Law’s UNROW Human Rights
Impact Litigation Clinic filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
raising an equal protection challenge in a case similar to Miller, Nguyen, and FloresVillar. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120
(4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-378). The Johnson petition challenged an immigration
statute that imposes different requirements on U.S. citizen mothers and fathers for
conferring citizenship on illegitimate children. Id. at *3–4. The Court denied the
petition. Johnson v. Whitehead, 132 S. Ct. 1005 (2012). Although the Supreme
Court does not currently have any DOMA challenges on its docket, the prominent
immigration legal organization, Immigration Equality, has recently filed suit in
federal district court challenging DOMA in the immigration context. See Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, Blesch v. Holder, No. CV 12-1578 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 2, 2012);
see also Julia Preston, Noncitizens Sue Over U.S. Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/noncitizens-sue-over-us-defense-ofmarriage-act.html (noting the lawsuit brought by Immigration Equality on behalf of
five same-sex couples). The suit may eventually give the Supreme Court an
opportunity to remedy its failure to confront the plenary power in Flores-Villar.
26. “Immigration” is used broadly to encompass all facets of immigration law,
including the benefits extended to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in the
immigration context. This Comment argues that a nuanced understanding of
immigration law is possible and necessary in order to understand the limits of
DOMA’s application to same-sex couples involving a foreign national.
27. “Admission” is a term of art in immigration law and is defined as the “lawful
entry of an alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.” INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006). Prior to
the 1996 amendments to the INA, aliens who were considered not to have “entered”
the United States were subject to exclusion proceedings while aliens considered to
have “entered” were subject to deportation proceedings. See Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (explaining the differences between deportation and
exclusion proceedings). With the 1996 amendments, the “entry” concept was
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distinctions. This part also argues that DOMA provides a specific
illustration of the plenary power’s limits because its influence on
certain portions of the immigration process is beyond the doctrine’s
scope.
Part III discusses the limited substantive framework’s
implications for judicial scrutiny and argues that traditional
constitutional standards, like strict or intermediate scrutiny, should
apply in challenges to DOMA in immigration.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Defining Congress’s Plenary Power in Immigration
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reference Congress’s
power to legislate generally in immigration.30 The Constitution’s
reference to Congress’s authority to legislate in immigration is
limited to Article I, Section 8, which gives Congress the authority to
“establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 31 The only remaining
reference to Congress’s immigration and naturalization authority is
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states
that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside.” 32
Absent explicit authority under the Constitution, Congress’s power
to legislate in immigration is rooted in more than a century of case
law.33 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Congress
has plenary power to legislate in immigration.34 Supreme Court
replaced by “admission” and the grounds of exclusion were replaced by grounds of
inadmissibility. See INA § 212 (containing the grounds of inadmissibility).
28. See INA § 237 (setting forth the grounds of deportability for which an alien
can be removed from the United States after being admitted). This Comment uses
“removal” and “deportation” interchangeably.
29. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 686 (1898) (defining
naturalization as the “admission of aliens to citizenship by judicial proceedings”).
30. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 (1987) (noting that the
power to regulate immigration is not one of Congress’s enumerated powers).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012)
(acknowledging that the federal government’s “broad, undoubted power” over
immigration rests in part on constitutional authority); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (establishing a standard of judicial deference to
Congress’s legislation in immigration).
34. While this Comment does not seek to catalog every plenary power decision,
many scholars have engaged in extensive analyses of the evolution of the plenary
power doctrine throughout history. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 30, at 885–86
(arguing that the doctrine established by a century of plenary power case law has
come back to haunt us, and that Congress’s plenary power in immigration must be
subject to constitutional limitations); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
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Justice Frankfurter articulated the weight of the plenary power
precedent when he wrote, in Galvan v. Press,35 that “there is not
merely ‘a page of history’ . . . but a whole volume.” 36
1.

The foundation of the plenary power doctrine: Unqualified deference to
Congress
The Supreme Court, in 1889, first articulated what came to be
known as the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States.37 In Chae Chan Ping, the Court upheld an order denying entry
to a Chinese foreign national based on a congressional act excluding
all Chinese laborers.38 The Court articulated Congress’s broad
authority in immigration and established a standard of extraordinary
deference to Congress that would become the hallmark of plenary
power case law.39 The Court justified this deference on the grounds
that decisions to exclude foreigners are deeply rooted in the nation’s
sovereign powers and directly related to national interests and
defense.40 The Court announced Congress’s broad authority to bar a
foreign national’s entry when “the public interest requires such
exclusion.” 41 In deferring to Congress, the Court limited judicial
review in decisions of exclusion.42 Thus, the Court in Chae Chan Ping
gave life to the plenary power doctrine of deference to Congress and
limited judicial review in immigration cases.
During the four years following Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court
twice returned to the plenary power doctrine. First, in Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States,43 the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s power, free
from judicial scrutiny, to set rules for the admission of foreign
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260–95 (analyzing the
various theories and externalities underlying the Supreme Court’s plenary power
jurisprudence); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560–75
(1990) (analyzing the distinction between constitutional and subconstitutional
norms in immigration law to explain the peculiar development of constitutional
analysis in plenary power precedent).
35. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
36. Id. at 530–31.
37. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
38. Id. at 582, 611.
39. See Henkin, supra note 30, at 858–59 (explaining that although the Court in
Chae Chan Ping did not say that the power to regulate immigration was free from
constitutional constraints, the Court’s holding and dicta have been interpreted to
mean that Congress’s power to regulate immigration is free from such constraints).
40. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–07; see also Legomsky, supra note 34, at 274
(explaining that by situating the decision within the concept of “sovereignty,” the
Court did not need to justify the plenary power with any constitutionally enumerated
authority).
41. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–07.
42. Id.
43. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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nationals.44 In upholding an immigration inspector’s decision to
deny admission to a Japanese national, the Court insulated the
discretionary decisions of executive officers from judicial review.45
Second, the Supreme Court further extended the plenary power
doctrine to decisions of expulsion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.46
In Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting, the Court again justified
Congress’s plenary power in terms of national sovereignty.47 The
decision in Fong Yue Ting marked an important milestone in plenary
power jurisprudence, however, as the Court distinguished between
the protections that might be afforded to aliens seeking entry to the
United States and aliens already within the United States.48 This
distinction caused tension throughout the plenary power case law
that followed and led to the Court’s recognition, early in the line of
plenary power cases, of a procedural due process limitation.49
In light of this distinction between the rights of aliens outside the
United States and aliens already within the United States, the Court
acknowledged in dicta in the 1903 case of Yamataya v. Fisher50 that a
foreign national within the United States should be afforded certain
procedural due process protections.51 The Court held, however, that
in the case of a foreign national seeking entry, “the decisions of
executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” 52 Foreshadowing the
ongoing conflict between the plenary power doctrine and traditional
constitutional safeguards, the Court concluded that while the plenary
power prevented judicial review of substantive due process issues,53
deportation proceedings may afford foreign nationals who are

44. Id. at 659.
45. Id. at 660.
46. 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
47. Id. at 711; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
48. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724 (stating that foreign nationals, while in the
United States, are entitled to the safeguards of the Constitution for their rights of
person, property, and civil and criminal liability, but if they remain aliens, they are
subject to removal whenever Congress deems their removal “necessary or expedient
for the public interest”).
49. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the procedural due process exception to the
plenary power doctrine).
50. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
51. See id. at 100 (concluding that immigration legislation does not “necessarily
exclude opportunity to the immigrant to be heard, when such opportunity is of
right”).
52. Id. at 98.
53. See id. at 97–98 (invoking the plenary power precedent to justify limits on the
judicial review of procedures Congress establishes for determining whether aliens
will be permitted to enter the United States).
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present in the United States some procedural due process
protections.54
The Court thus laid the foundation of the plenary power doctrine
with unqualified justifications of state sovereignty, foreign relations,
peace, and security.55 Early plenary power cases reflect “an absolute
‘hands off’ approach by the Court” 56 and have limited the application
of traditional constitutional standards in immigration law.57 By
establishing the plenary power doctrine with sweeping statements of
sovereignty and generalized references to the field of immigration,
the Court erected a formidable obstacle to constitutional challenges
involving immigration.
2.

The evolution of the plenary power doctrine: “Limited” judicial review
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts struggled to
address constitutional challenges in immigration cases within the
constraints of the firmly entrenched plenary power doctrine.58 By the
next wave of plenary power cases in the 1950s, the nineteenth-century
plenary power case law guided the Supreme Court through stare
decisis, sometimes seemingly to the Court’s chagrin.59 By the 1970s,
however, the Court began to routinely review certain constitutional
challenges in recognition that judicial review, albeit “limited,” was
appropriate in immigration cases.60
In the 1950 case United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,61 the
Supreme Court affirmed the limited judicial review of exclusion
54. See id. at 101 (stating that aliens who are present in the United States and
who have become a “part of its population” are entitled to an opportunity to be
heard before they are deported).
55. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893) (justifying
the “right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners” as inherent to its sovereignty
and incidental to Congress’s control of matters of foreign relations, peace, and
security).
56. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 805 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 260 (stating that plenary power precedent has
established that “immigration is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional
law simply do not apply”); Motomura, supra note 34, at 613 (arguing that the “most
fundamental problem” caused by the plenary power doctrine is that it has “seriously
impaired the process of dialogue” on the role of constitutional standards in
immigration law).
58. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 289–92 (outlining the effect of changing
political forces on the nation and the Court’s attitude toward immigration
throughout the twentieth century). Stephen Legomsky was appointed Chief Counsel
of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2011.
59. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (lamenting the fact that the
“slate is not clean” for the exercise of judicial discretion in challenges to
immigration statutes); see also Legomsky, supra note 34, at 285 (“The more support
the plenary power doctrine accumulated, the more entrenched it became.”).
60. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (considering a First
Amendment challenge to Congress’s plenary power in the area of immigration).
61. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
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decisions, upholding the exclusion of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen.62
The Court reinforced the idea that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a
fundamental act of sovereignty” and extended judicial deference to
executive officer determinations enforcing Congress’s rules of
admissibility.63 Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, argued
that the Court should distinguish between immigration statutes that
affect only aliens and statutes that affect the rights of U.S. citizens.64
Despite this potential distinction, the Court ultimately yielded to
Congress’s plenary power in exclusion.65 Thus, Knauff reinforced the
Court’s deference to executive branch decisions enforcing the rules
Congress established for admissibility.66
The Supreme Court further strengthened Congress’s absolute
plenary power in questions of admission and exclusion in Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel Mezei.67 The Court⎯acknowledging the
procedural due process exception to the plenary power
doctrine⎯reasoned that while aliens in the United States may be
expelled only after proceedings that conform to traditional standards
of fairness, “an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on
different footing.” 68 The Court thus concluded that Congress, not
the judiciary, has the power to dictate an alien’s right to enter the
United States.69
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy70 and Galvan v. Press71⎯two 1950s cases
involving the removal of alleged members of the Communist
Party⎯the Supreme Court once again acknowledged the procedural
due process exception in removal proceedings but ultimately
recognized its own limited role in reviewing immigration statutes.72
62. Id. at 543.
63. See id. at 547 (upholding an executive branch decision to deny an alien’s
exclusion without a hearing despite the alien’s marriage to a U.S. citizen).
64. See id. at 549–50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that a benefit
extended to a U.S. citizen cannot be taken away without a hearing).
65. Id. at 543 (majority opinion).
66. Id.
67. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
68. Id. at 212.
69. See id. at 210 (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.”). But see id. at 217 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (taking issue with the extent to which the majority deferred to Congress
in matters of exclusion and arguing that the alien’s exclusion did not deprive him of
constitutional rights despite the practical effect of which being two years of detention
on Ellis Island).
70. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
71. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
72. See id. at 531 (recognizing that executive branch officers must respect
procedural due process in the enforcement of immigration policies while
acknowledging that the formulation of those policies is trusted exclusively to
Congress); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
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In a thorough defense of the justifications for the distinct treatment
of aliens in the United States and aliens seeking entry to the United
States, the Court in Harisiades reasoned that by retaining the
immunities of foreign citizenship and thus avoiding the full burdens
of allegiance to the United States, aliens had no right to remain in
the United States.73 This time, Justice Frankfurter concurred and
summarized the mantra that had become the plenary power doctrine:
The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of
aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for
determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to
aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based,
have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.74

With this deference to Congress’s decision to exclude all past and
present members of the Communist Party, the Court rejected the
claims of the resident alien petitioners that their removal violated
due process.75
The Court subtly changed its tone when it confronted a similar
situation two years later in Galvan. There, the Court was reluctant to
invoke the plenary power doctrine to affirm the removal of a longtime permanent resident because of a brief prior membership in the
Communist Party.76 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
explained that an alien is a “person” as far as the Due Process Clause
is concerned and that the executive branch must respect the
procedural safeguards of due process in its enforcement of
immigration laws.77 In addressing the conflict between Congress’s
plenary power and its constitutional constraints, Justice Frankfurter
acknowledged that absent precedent, the Due Process Clause could
qualify Congress’s discretion in regulating immigration.78 Unable to
conclude that Congress’s decision to remove Communist Party
members was unconstitutional because of plenary power precedent,
resident alien has a right to property and liberty and is entitled to due process
protections).
73. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 585–86.
74. Id. at 596–97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 591 (majority opinion).
76. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523–24, 530, 532 (suggesting that plenary power
precedent influences the due process protections that might otherwise be afforded
to foreign nationals but ultimately affirming the deportation of a Mexican citizen
who had been living in the United States for approximately thirty-six years before an
immigration officer ordered him deported).
77. See id. at 530 (“Much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean
slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion
heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and
deportation of aliens . . . [b]ut the slate is not clean.”).
78. Id. at 530–31.
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Justice Frankfurter noted that Congress’s exclusive authority to
formulate immigration policy “ha[d] become about as firmly
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as
any aspect of our government.” 79
The plenary power doctrine was without a doubt “firmly
imbedded” in the Court’s jurisprudence by the 1970s.80 The Court’s
characterization of the doctrine, however, as it addressed increasingly
complex challenges to immigration statutes, has led to confusion
regarding the doctrine’s boundaries or, more accurately, the lack of
boundaries.81 Unable to firmly establish the limits of the plenary
power doctrine but forced to acknowledge the tension between
constitutional protections and the plenary power, the Court
established “unusual standards” for constitutional challenges in
immigration law.82
For instance, the Court’s decision to uphold the exclusion of a
prominent Marxist scholar, Ernest Mandel, in Kleindeinst v. Mandel,83
rested on Congress’s long-established plenary power to exclude and
prescribe terms of admission free from judicial intervention.84 In
Kleindeinst, the Court addressed a claim that excluding Mandel
violated the First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens who would have
attended his scholarly presentations.85 Rather than relying on the
traditional constitutional standard that the government can only
restrict First Amendment rights if the restriction is necessary to
further a compelling government interest,86 the Court reasoned that
the executive branch exercised its power to exclude Mandel based on
a “facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale.87 Thus, because of the
plenary power doctrine’s influence, “facially legitimate and bona
fide” became the Court’s standard of scrutiny for constitutional
challenges to immigration statutes.88
79. Id. at 531.
80. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 291 (stating that beginning in the 1960s, the
plenary power doctrine left little room to litigate constitutional challenges to
immigration legislation).
81. See id. at 306–07 (noting that courts, anxious to establish boundaries to the
plenary power doctrine, have devised ways to circumvent plenary power precedent).
82. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “merely ‘legitimate’” governmental interests are not sufficient to
override First Amendment rights).
83. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
84. Id. at 766.
85. Id. at 754–60.
86. Id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s “unusual
standard” (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring))).
87. Id. at 770 (majority opinion).
88. See generally Motomura, supra note 34 (discussing the increasing application
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An important constitutional change took place during this era of
the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence, which could explain the
subtle shift in the Court’s analysis from avoidance of constitutional
questions to the use of “unusual” constitutional standards in
immigration cases.89 The evolution of the standards of scrutiny
applied in equal protection claims, especially the heightened scrutiny
applied to classifications based on alienage, was the backdrop for the
Court’s decisions in the 1970s.90 Despite these developments, the
plenary power doctrine continued to play an influential role. For
example, in Graham v. Richardson,91 the Court applied heightened
scrutiny to strike down Arizona and Pennsylvania laws prohibiting
aliens from receiving welfare benefits.92 In contrast, the Court in
Mathews v. Diaz93 established a different standard for federal law,
In
where plenary-power-style deference was maintained.94
distinguishing Mathews from Graham, the Court reasoned that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially
different from the constitutional provisions controlling the federal
power over immigration and naturalization.95 The Court held that
there was no reason to treat aliens differently from citizens at the
state level.96 At the federal level, however, the Court concluded that
the political branches’ need to respond flexibly to changing global,
political, and economic conditions justifies different treatment.97
Since the 1970s, the Court’s absolute avoidance of constitutional
questions in immigration, as exemplified in Chae Chan Ping, has
slowly eroded, but the Court has continued to afford broad deference

of “subconstitutional” and “phantom norms” in immigration cases, which hinder
the dialogue about traditional constitutional norms in the immigration context).
89. Compare Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 428–45 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(engaging in equal protection analysis to uphold a statute imposing different
requirements based on gender), with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
603 (1889) (concluding that a congressional act aimed at excluding Chinese laborers
was constitutional without engaging in equal protection analysis).
90. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (reasoning that
classifications based on alienage are subject to “close judicial scrutiny”).
91. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
92. Id. at 376. In addition to finding that the laws violated equal protection, the
Court also held that the laws encroached on Congress’s exclusive power over
immigration. Id. at 376–78. This case arose from a class action case that argued the
restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause and was preempted by the Social
Security Act. Id. at 368. The Court noted that the power to control immigration is
vested solely in the federal government. Id. at 379.
93. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
94. See id. at 86–87 (upholding a Medicare eligibility statute requiring permanent
residence of at least five years to qualify for Medicare benefits).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id.
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to Congress.98 For instance, in the seminal plenary power case of
Fiallo v. Bell,99 the Court recognized its limited authority to review
immigration legislation,100 which some heralded as the Court’s
acknowledgment that the plenary power doctrine no longer
functioned as a complete barrier to judicial review.101 In a footnote,
the Fiallo Court acknowledged a “limited judicial responsibility under
the Constitution,” even in Congress’s legislation of admission and
exclusion.102 Despite these acknowledgements of restricted judicial
review, the Court ultimately affirmed the influence of the plenary
power doctrine.103 In sum, despite indications throughout the
twentieth century that the Court was willing to entertain
constitutional challenges to immigration statutes, it was unable or
unwilling to sidestep the enduring plenary power precedent.
3.

The modern plenary power doctrine: “Unusual standards” and avoidance
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has continued to apply
diluted constitutional standards to immigration cases even though it
has accepted that Congress’s plenary power is limited by the
Constitution.104 Rather than abandon the doctrine altogether, the
Court has avoided confronting the doctrine’s scope when reviewing
constitutional challenges.
The Supreme Court creatively avoided the plenary power doctrine
in 1998 when it decided Miller v. Albright.105 In Miller, the Court
addressed a gender-based equal protection challenge to a provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which governed the
acquisition of citizenship at birth by a child born out of wedlock
outside the United States.106 The provision contained different
98. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (noting that there are
“important constitutional limitations” on Congress’s plenary power); see also FloresVillar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam) (affirming a Ninth Circuit
decision that Congress has “virtually plenary power” in immigration).
99. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
100. Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
101. See Motomura, supra note 34, at 608 (arguing that although the Court
rejected the constitutional claim in Fiallo because of the plenary power doctrine, it
left the “door slightly ajar” for judicial review).
102. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5.
103. See infra Part II.C (discussing the statute at issue in Fiallo and the plenary
power of Congress in immigration policy decisions).
104. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (construing an immigration
statute to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation because allowing
indefinite detention would “raise serious constitutional concerns”). See generally
Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002)
(arguing that Zadvydas helped set the stage for the abandonment of the plenary
power doctrine).
105. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
106. Id. at 424 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
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requirements for illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers and
illegitimate children of U.S. citizen fathers.107 The Court ultimately
decided that the petitioner lacked standing, but split on whether the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fifth
Amendment.108 Justice Stevens, in an opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, wrote that “important” government interests
supported the difference in statutory requirements and that the
provision was “well tailored” to serve those interests.109 In doing so,
Justice Stevens applied a standard less demanding than the
traditional constitutional analysis in gender-based classifications,
which requires an exceedingly persuasive justification and narrow
tailoring to a government objective.110 In his dissent, Justice Breyer
argued that instead of applying the plenary power doctrine to justify
less stringent equal protection standards, the Court should
distinguish between statutes that implicate the plenary power and
those that are merely related to immigration or naturalization.111
Justice Breyer explained that the case did not involve naturalization
but rather a question of the conferral of citizenship at birth.112 Thus,
Justice Breyer maintained that the issue did not justify a deferential
standard of review because it was beyond the scope of Congress’s
plenary power in naturalization.113
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Supreme Court case law
has continued to suggest that the plenary power influences the
standard of judicial review rather than justifies avoidance of
constitutional questions altogether. In Nguyen v. INS,114 the Court
again confronted an equal protection challenge to gender-based

107. Id. at 428.
108. Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the statute did
not violate equal protection, id. at 445, while Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
concluded that the petitioner lacked standing, id. at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment). Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined in the judgment. Id. at 452
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer
dissented, arguing that the statute violated equal protection. Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); id. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 424, 438, 440 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (holding that the statute
served a “valid” government interest of encouraging the development of a
relationship between a citizen parent and child while the child is minor, as well as
fostering ties between a foreign-born child and the United States).
110. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (concluding that the
Virginia Military Institute’s gender-based admissions policy was unconstitutional for
lack of an exceedingly persuasive justification); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 472 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the gender-based distinctions at question lacked the
“exceedingly persuasive” support that traditional constitutional analysis requires).
111. Miller, 523 U.S. at 478–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 478.
113. Id. at 478–79.
114. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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classifications in citizenship statutes.115 In determining that the
statutes were consistent with the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection, the majority, in a 5–4 decision, held that the statutes were
justified by important government objectives and were substantially
related to those objectives.116 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, reasoned that there was no need to address the issue of the
plenary power’s influence on the standards of constitutional review
because the statute satisfied the heightened standard.117
In response to Justice Kennedy’s assertion, Justice O’Connor,
joined in dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued
that the majority in Nguyen had once again allowed the plenary power
to justify a standard of review more lenient than the “exceedingly
persuasive” standard required by the Court’s equal protection
precedent.118 Justice O’Connor argued that the majority’s willingness
to search for possible rationalizations for the statute’s gender-based
classifications and its failure to elaborate on the actual importance of
the government interests at stake suggested that the majority was
applying rational basis review while calling it heightened scrutiny.119
Most importantly, while the majority avoided the plenary power
question, Justice O’Connor proposed a new understanding of the
plenary power’s scope.120 Justice O’Connor argued that plenary
power deference only applies when a person is an alien, not when
determining a person’s status for purposes of constitutional
protection.121 She reasoned that determining an individual’s status
was a question “logically prior” to admission and thus beyond the
plenary power’s scope.122 Justice O’Connor concluded that because
Nguyen involved a statute governing the conferral of citizenship at
115. Id. at 57–58.
116. Id. at 58–59, 70.
117. Id. at 61.
118. See id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the way in which the
majority explained and applied heightened scrutiny was “a stranger to” the Court’s
precedent).
119. See id. at 78–80 (maintaining that the majority, contrary to the requirements
of heightened scrutiny, failed to inquire into the actual purposes of the statute as
illustrated by the fact that the Immigration and Nationality Services advanced
purposes quite different from those that the majority found). The dissent argued
that the majority’s “hypothesized rationale” was insufficient under heightened
scrutiny and more akin to the justifications permitted under rational basis review. Id.
at 75, 84. The dissent ultimately concluded that the statute violated equal
protection, most importantly because of the insufficiency of the fit between the
statute’s “discriminatory means and the asserted end.” Id. at 74, 80.
120. See id. at 94, 96 (arguing that that the plaintiffs in Nguyen could surmount the
hurdle of plenary power deference because their situation was readily distinguishable
from Fiallo, the pivotal case in plenary power deference).
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id.
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birth, not the admission of aliens, traditional standards of equal
protection review should apply.123
In 2008, an evenly split Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Flores-Villar124 to apply a similarly
deferential standard to a question of U.S. citizenship.125 Ruben
Flores-Villar, a Mexican national, was arrested for his presence in the
United States after deportation.126 In his defense, Flores-Villar
claimed that he was not deportable because he had acquired U.S.
citizenship through his father, a naturalized U.S. citizen.127 His
application for a certificate of citizenship had been denied on the
grounds that his father, who was sixteen when Flores-Villar was born,
had not been present in the United States for five years after his
fourteenth birthday,128 as the statute required.129
Flores-Villar
brought an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, challenging the INA’s five-year residency
requirement for U.S. citizen fathers to confer citizenship on children
born out of wedlock⎯a requirement the statute did not impose on
U.S. citizen mothers.130 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, citing Nguyen, acknowledged that it was unclear
whether a lesser degree of scrutiny applied to gender-based
classifications in the immigration context but concluded that there
was a need for special judicial deference.131 The district court held
that Flores-Villar’s equal protection claim failed because there
appeared to be a “bona fide reason” for applying different physical
presence requirements to unwed U.S. citizen mothers and fathers.132
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit bolstered the deferential standard
applied by the district court, stating that legislative distinctions in
immigration do not need to be as “carefully tuned” as the domestic

123. Id. at 97 (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
124. 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 131 S.
Ct. 2312 (2011).
125. Id. at 996.
126. See id. at 994 (stating that Flores-Villar had been previously convicted of
importation of marijuana, two counts of illegal entry into the United States, and had
been removed from the United States pursuant to removal orders on numerous
occasions).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. INA § 18(u)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1401a(g) (2006).
130. Id. at 993.
131. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2007)
(citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001)), aff’d, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008),
aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
132. Id. at 1165.
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context requires.133 The Ninth Circuit dispensed with the need to
determine whether a lesser standard of review is required in plenary
power cases.134 The court then concluded that the connection
between the statutory requirement and Congress’s interests in
minimizing the risks of statelessness and assuring a link between an
unwed citizen father and a child born out of wedlock was “sufficiently
persuasive” to survive constitutional challenge.135 Thus, in an
attempt to apply both intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review,
the Ninth Circuit applied a standard less demanding than the
traditional constitutional analysis in gender-based claims.136 While
avoiding the question of the plenary power’s influence on the level of
scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plenary power to influence its
application of traditional constitutional standards.137 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s deferential standard in a 4–4 per
curiam decision.138
The modern plenary power decisions demonstrate the continuing
tension between plenary power precedent and the constitutional
safeguards afforded to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals.139 The
Supreme Court failed to clarify the plenary power’s scope when it
avoided the question of the plenary power’s influence in Miller,
Nguyen, and most recently, Flores-Villar. While the Court’s decision to
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Flores-Villar could
signify the “steady erosion” of the plenary power doctrine,140 it is
likely that this erosion will leave the courts to grapple with the
plenary power doctrine in its modern form141—a power that
influences the way that constitutional standards are applied to
immigration statutes. As the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the
133. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 997 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791–93, 799
n.8 (1977)).
134. Id. at 996 n.2.
135. Id. at 996.
136. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring an
exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based classifications).
137. See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 996 (allowing the plenary power to influence the
court’s determination of whether the statute’s means sufficiently fit its objectives).
138. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).
139. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 806–07 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(advocating for a distinction between constitutional challenges brought by U.S.
citizens and those brought by aliens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
734 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (arguing that different rights should be afforded
to aliens domiciled in the United States and those seeking entry).
140. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 936–37 (predicting that the plenary power
doctrine will not be abolished by the Supreme Court cleaning the slate once and for
all, but will instead be worn down little by little through court-made exceptions and
qualifications).
141. See id. at 937 (arguing that courts will likely end up with an “emasculated”
version of the plenary power doctrine, or a “PPD-lite”).
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plenary power doctrine threatens to drive the doctrine’s influence
underground in judicial review,142 Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller
and Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen are reminders that
distinctions within immigration law are possible and that the plenary
power doctrine can be confronted and more clearly defined.
B. DOMA and Its Application in Immigration
In 1996, Congress passed DOMA in a wave of panic that states
would begin to recognize same-sex marriage.143 DOMA was passed in
a climate inimical to gay and lesbian rights, when the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick144 condoned state laws
criminalizing private homosexual conduct.145 DOMA’s supporters
argued that it merely reflected a definition of marriage that had been
the core of the traditional family for over 5,000 years,146 a definition
that had until then been so obvious that it did not require
explanation in the myriad statutes referencing marriage.147 Despite
the arguments of DOMA’s opponents that it exceeded Congress’s
constitutional authority,148 DOMA followed in the footsteps of
policies like “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” 149 More recently, as the tide of

142. See Nina Pillard, Comment, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 836 (2002) (arguing that while the
Court may be backing away from the plenary power doctrine, in that it has not
chosen to explicitly weaken it in recent case law, it may be submerging the doctrine
and creating a host of new problems in constitutional challenges to immigration
statutes).
143. See E.J. Graff, 15 Years After DOMA, Hearing Reveals a Nation Transformed,
ATLANTIC (July 20, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2011/07/15-years-after-doma-hearing-reveals-a-nation-transformed/242273/
(attributing the motivation for DOMA to the Supreme Court of Hawaii’s decision in
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993), which federal lawmakers feared would
“open the door to same-sex marriages in that state”). In Lewin, Hawaii’s highest
court held that the state’s statutory ban on same-sex marriages was subject to strict
scrutiny and remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the law met
that burden. 852 P.2d at 74.
144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
145. See id. at 196 (concluding that state anti-sodomy laws were constitutional in
light of the belief that homosexual sodomy is “immoral and unacceptable”). Today,
by contrast, rights activists face a more hospitable political and social climate. See
David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
NOVO 187, 187–88 (discussing the successes in the gay marriage context in the past
four years, including its legalization in several states and public recognition by the
President and Vice President, as well as the executive’s newly adopted position that it
will no longer defend DOMA).
146. 142 CONG. REC. 22,442 (1996) (statement of Sen. William Philip Gramm).
147. See id. at 22,440 (statement of Sen. Donald Nickles) (“[T]hese provisions
simply reaffirm what is already known . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., id. at 22,439 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (arguing that
Congress cannot add or subtract from the Full Faith and Credit Clause and thus that
DOMA is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power).
149. See Graff, supra note 143 (describing the “moral panic” during the time of
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gay and lesbian rights has shifted,150 DOMA has become the subject
of attacks at both judicial and political levels.151
Unlike DOMA, the INA’s definitions of “spouse” and “marriage”
do not address same-sex relationships, despite Congress having
redrafted and amended the INA over 100 times in the statute’s
history.152 The INA defines spouse only by what it is not —stating that
an individual is not a spouse if the parties were not physically present
at the marriage ceremony, unless the marriage has been otherwise
consummated.153 In the 1952 iteration, the INA contained a
provision aimed at preventing the admission of homosexuals, but
Congress has since removed that provision.154 DOMA, however,
establishes a federal definition of marriage:
In determining the meaning of any act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.155

DOMA does not reference immigration, nor did Congress
expressly contemplate immigration during the Act’s passage.156
While the INA was not amended to reflect DOMA’s federal
definition, DOMA applies to the immigration context through
administrative agency and consular interpretations of “marriage” and
“spouse” at the adjudicatory stage of immigration petitions and
applications.157 Thus, DOMA effectively bars a foreign national from
DOMA’s passage, including Congress’s passage of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy
in 1993, the Hawaii lawsuit, and the passage of several state “Defense of Marriage”
laws and constitutional amendments). “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”⎯the United States’
official policy on homosexuals in the military from 1994 until 2011⎯barred openly
gay or bisexual individuals from serving in the military. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 654
(2006) (repealed 2011).
150. See supra note 145 (discussing the shift in the political and social treatment of
homosexual rights).
151. See Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13 (announcing the Department of
Justice’s stance that it will no longer defend DOMA); Obama Supports Repeal of GayMarriage Ban, THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2011, 2:40 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2011/07/obama-supports-repeal-of-gay-marriage-ban/242197/
(discussing President Obama’s support for the Repeal of Marriage Act introduced in
the Senate in July 2011, which would repeal DOMA).
152. INA § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006); see also Titshaw, supra note
6, at 559 (suggesting that Congress intended to leave “marriage” undefined in the
INA).
153. INA § 101(a)(35).
154. See infra Part II.C (detailing the 1952 INA’s ban on homosexual admission).
155. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
156. 142 CONG. REC. 22,437–63 (1996).
157. This Comment focuses on DOMA at the adjudicatory stage of immigrant visa
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immigrating to the United States on the basis of a same-sex
relationship with a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.158
Ordinarily, a U.S. citizen or permanent resident can petition to
legalize a foreign national spouse using United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-130, Petition for Alien
Relative.159 In the case of a spouse of a U.S. citizen, an I-130 petition
establishes the foreign national’s immediate relative status for
purposes of visa eligibility.160 These petitions are a necessary step in
marriage-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status applications
and are adjudicated by USCIS regardless of whether the foreign
national will ultimately seek permanent residency through
adjustment of status within the United States or by way of an
immigrant visa through a consulate abroad.161 If a USCIS adjudicator
finds that the facts stated on the petition are accurate and establish a
qualifying relationship between the U.S. citizen and foreign national,
the petition is approved.162 An approved petition, however, does not
guarantee the foreign national’s admission into the United States; the
foreign national must also apply for an immigrant visa abroad or for
adjustment of status within the United States after the petition is
approved.163 Even if an immigrant visa petition is approved, a
consular official at the port of entry or an immigration officer
petitions. DOMA, however, influences eligibility for immigration benefits in a variety
of circumstances, such as eligibility for certain types of relief from removal that
require a showing of hardship to a U.S. citizen’s spouse. See, e.g., INA §
240A(b)(1)(D) (allowing discretionary relief from removal where, in addition to
other requirements, a foreign national’s removal would result in extremely unusual
hardship to a U.S. citizen’s spouse).
158. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL—
REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION, ch. 21.3(I) Petition for a Spouse [hereinafter
ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL], available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010Vgn
VCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd
190aRCRD&CH=afm (instructing immigration adjudicators that DOMA’s federal
definition of marriage controls whether a marriage is valid for purposes of
immigration); 9 U.S. DEP’T OF ST., FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 40.1 n.1 (2011), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86920.pdf (instructing consular
officers that same-sex marriages cannot be recognized for immigration purposes
because DOMA determines that these relationships do not “meet the Federal
definition of marriage”).
159. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1996).
160. Id. Congress has established a quota system for immigrant visas depending
on the basis or qualifying relationship upon which the visa is issued. INA § 201.
Foreign nationals classified as “immediate relatives” are exempt from these quotas
and are not required to wait for an available visa. Id. § 201(b). Immediate relative
status is thus a highly coveted immigrant visa classification. An “immediate relative”
is defined as the child, spouse, or parent of a citizen of the United States. Id. §
201(b)(2)(A)(i).
161. See INA § 204 (detailing “an investigation of the facts in each case”).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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adjudicating an application for adjustment of status ultimately makes
the decision to admit a foreign national based on a review of the
individual foreign national’s admissibility.164
Immigration officials usually consider three factors when
determining whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes:
first, the validity of the marriage where celebrated,165 second, the
evidence of the bona fides of the marital relationship,166 and third,
the existence of a categorical public policy exception regarding who
may marry whom.167 Historically, the rule in both interstate and
immigration related marriage recognition has been that a marriage
valid in the state or country where it was celebrated is valid
everywhere.168 Conflict of laws principles in marriage recognition,
however, allow an exception to this general rule where the marriage
violates the “strong public policy” of another state.169 The BIA and
federal courts have sometimes recognized similar public policy
exceptions in applying the INA.170
Based on DOMA’s federal definition of marriage, USCIS advises
immigration adjudicators that same-sex marriages are not valid
marital relationships for purposes of the I-130 petition.171 For foreign
nationals in same-sex marriages who lack any other basis for
immigrating to the United States, DOMA effectively denies their
164. Id.; see also id. § 212 (containing the grounds of inadmissibility).
165. See id. § 216 (pertaining to the removal of conditions on permanent
residence for foreign national spouses).
166. Id. § 204; id. § 216.
167. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 549–50 (describing the evolution of rules for
marriage recognition in immigration, and stating that standards for recognizing the
marital relationship are the result of immigration cases “decided in a piecemeal,
case-specific manner”).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see also
Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy
Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 105
(2010) (“All states follow the venerable choice of law rule of marriage recognition,
which holds that a marriage is considered valid in any jurisdiction if it was valid in the
state of celebration, even if it would not be valid in the state where recognition is
sought.”).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (establishing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not require a state to violate its own legitimate public policy by applying
another state’s law); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(concluding that Florida was not required to apply another state’s same-sex marriage
law because it conflicted with Florida’s public policy of opposing same-sex marriage).
170. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding a public
policy exception to the general rule of marriage recognition precluding the
immigration of a foreign national in a same-sex marriage long before the passage of
DOMA). See generally Titshaw, supra note 6, at 579–88 (discussing the federal public
policy exceptions historically recognized under the INA).
171. See ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 158, at Ch. 21.3(2)(I) (advising
immigration adjudicators that a marriage’s validity for immigration purposes is a
matter of federal law governed by DOMA).
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admission.172 Given DOMA’s uncertain constitutional footing and
Attorney General Holder’s letter to Congress stating that the
executive branch will no longer defend DOMA, courts are employing
a variety of ostensibly ameliorative measures to counter DOMA’s
effects at the adjudicatory stage of immigration benefits.173 In some
cases, courts have put removal proceedings on hold, others have
reopened cases sua sponte to allow applications for relief where
DOMA previously barred same-sex immigration benefits, and still
others have closed cases altogether.174 As uncertainty remains while
challenges to DOMA’s effect on binational same-sex couples mount,
clarifying the plenary power doctrine’s influence on standards of
judicial scrutiny of DOMA in immigration becomes increasingly
important.
II. CONGRESS’S PLENARY POWER IS LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DOMA’S
APPLICATION IN IMMIGRATION IS BEYOND THE POWER’S SCOPE
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to the plenary power
doctrine, since its decision in Miller, demonstrates that a nuanced
understanding of Congress’s power in immigration and the limits of
plenary power deference is possible.175 The Court’s willingness to
engage in constitutional analysis, albeit colored by the influence of
the plenary power doctrine, is evidence that the plenary power is no
longer a barrier against the judicial review of all questions
immigration-related.176 This Comment recommends a substantive
framework for understanding the scope of the plenary power that
would limit the doctrine to questions of admission, removal,
naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions. This limited
substantive framework will illuminate the boundaries of the plenary
power doctrine in general. This Comment further argues that, given
this limited substantive framework, DOMA applies to an area of
immigration law beyond the plenary power doctrine’s scope. Thus,
traditional constitutional standards should apply to DOMA-related
172. Id.; see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (describing the case of a
foreign national who was denied an immigrant visa because DOMA does not
recognize his relationship).
173. See Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13 (articulating the unconstitutionality
of DOMA).
174. See Semple, supra note 14 (describing a case where an alien’s deportation was
cancelled after he was denied immigration benefits because of DOMA).
175. See supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the modern plenary power case law from
Miller to Flores-Villar as essentially allowing Congress’s plenary power to influence the
standard of judicial review rather than justifying the avoidance of constitutional
questions).
176. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the diluted constitutional standards applied by
the Supreme Court in Nguyen and Flores-Villar).
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challenges in the immigration context.
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Should Be Limited to Questions of
Admission, Removal, Naturalization, and Immigration Policy Distinctions
A basic framework for understanding the plenary power’s scope is
necessary in light of the myriad complexities of immigration law and
the difficulty of reconciling these complexities with constitutional
requirements.
This Comment suggests a limited substantive
framework that would confine plenary power deference to four
substantive areas of immigration law: admission, removal,
naturalization, and practical immigration policy distinctions. The
Supreme Court routinely applies plenary power deference in varying
degrees to cases involving these four categories, but immigrationrelated issues that do not fall into one of these categories may be
beyond the scope of the plenary power.177
The Supreme Court’s increasingly refined approach to
constitutional questions in each of these four substantive areas is
evidence that courts are capable of making the distinctions in
immigration law necessary to employ a substantive framework for
plenary power analysis. This refined approach is a departure from
the tradition, established through twentieth century plenary power
case law, which extended great deference to Congress.178 Thus,
rather than approaching immigration as a nebulous concept over
which Congress has unqualified power, courts would first inquire into
whether the issue fits squarely into one of the substantive categories
traditionally afforded some degree of plenary power deference.179
While the Supreme Court does not currently employ a limited
substantive framework in plenary power cases, Justice O’Connor’s
dissent in Nguyen and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller suggest that the
Court may entertain such a framework.180 In light of the increasing
number of constitutional challenges to immigration statutes and the
DOMA issue in particular, a narrowed and disciplined approach to
177. See infra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
standards that apply in immigration cases when the plenary power is not implicated).
178. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 306 (“So great has been the power of the
word ‘immigration’ that its mere mention has been enough to propel the Court into
a cataleptic trance.”).
179. See infra Parts II.A.1–4 (discussing each of the four categories traditionally
granted plenary power deference).
180. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen, where
she attempted to distinguish between citizenship and the questions logically prior to
citizenship, and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller, where he attempted to distinguish
between naturalization and citizenship at birth); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing
Justice O’Connor’s logically prior standard in the context of immigrant visa
petitions).
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the plenary power is necessary.
1.

Admission
In cases involving admission, the Supreme Court has routinely
deemed Congress’s plenary power to be absolute.181 Since Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, the Court has afforded extraordinary deference
to the rules that Congress establishes for the admission of foreign
nationals.182 The Court laid the foundation for this principle in
Nishimura Ekiu based on notions of sovereignty and selfpreservation.183
In the long line of plenary power cases, the Court has never
questioned Congress’s power to determine rules for admission.184
Reciting what has become the plenary power mantra in cases of
admission, Justice Powell in Fiallo acknowledged that “‘over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” 185 This reasoning
has persisted throughout the doctrine’s case law involving questions
of admission.186
2.

Removal
In cases involving removal, the Supreme Court now recognizes the

181. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(recognizing, even in dissent, that Congress has complete legislative power over the
admission of aliens); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that recent
decisions had not departed from the well-established rule that Congress’s power to
exclude aliens is a fundamental sovereign attribute); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (emphasizing that Congress’s power to exclude
aliens is not “open to controversy”).
182. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting the long line of plenary power cases
reinforcing the rule that Congress’s power to exclude aliens is inherent to
sovereignty); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953)
(“[R]espondent’s right to enter the United States depends on the congressional will
. . . .” (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590–91 (1952))); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (explaining that
whatever the rules of deportation may be, there is no question that judicial review is
limited in cases of exclusion).
183. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”).
184. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (stating that since the
Court in Chae Chan Ping articulated the principle that the power to exclude is
inherent in sovereignty and is to be exercised exclusively by the political branches,
the “Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion”).
185. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766; Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
186. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
Congress’s complete legislative power over the admission of aliens).
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constraints of procedural due process on plenary power deference.187
While the Court in Harisiades issued a stern denial of due process
claims presented by an alien facing deportation,188 by the time the
Court decided Galvan, it readily acknowledged that an alien is a
“person” for purposes of the Due Process Clause and that the
executive branch must respect procedural due process safeguards
when enforcing immigration laws.189
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Court had accepted the
procedural due process exception in removal cases. In 2001, the
Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis,190 read an immigration statute
“in light of the Constitution’s demands” and concluded that the
statute contained an implicit “reasonable time” limitation on postremoval detention.191
Thus, the Court now recognizes that
Congress’s power to determine who will be removed is subject to
certain “important constitutional limitations” despite the removal
authority being firmly established within Congress’s plenary power.192
3.

Naturalization
Courts have recognized similarly limited constitutional protections
in cases involving naturalization.193 When a case directly implicates
Congress’s naturalization authority, the Supreme Court has afforded
Congress broad deference.194 Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen
and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller, however, follow the trend of

187. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 926, 931–32 (pointing to Yamataya v. Fisher as
evidence that the Supreme Court has generally guaranteed at least one constitutional
right —due process —in immigration cases).
188. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952) (concluding that
an alien’s ability to remain in the United States is a matter of permission and
tolerance and that courts have consistently sustained the government’s power to
“terminate its hospitality”).
189. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (recognizing procedural due
process safeguards even though the “formulation” of immigration policies is
“entrusted exclusively to Congress”).
190. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
191. Id. at 682, 689.
192. Compare id. at 695 (stating that Congress’s plenary power to “create
immigration law” is “subject to important constitutional limitations”), with Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that the right of a nation to
deport foreigners is “absolute and unqualified”).
193. See Price v. INS, 941 F.2d 878, 883–84 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that once
an alien gains admission and establishes ties as a permanent resident, his
constitutional status changes but that constitutional protections may be limited), op.
withdrawn, substituted op., on reh’g, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.1992); see also Berenyi v. Dist.
Dir., 385 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1967) (noting the heavy burden on an alien to establish
eligibility for citizenship).
194. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883–84 (1988) (limiting federal courts’
authority to confer citizenship to “strict compliance with the terms of an authorizing
statute”).
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increasingly inventive techniques to limit plenary power deference.195
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggests that while Congress’s
plenary power over naturalization is absolute, the extension of this
power to questions logically prior to naturalization could be subject
to traditional judicial inquiry.196
The Court’s willingness to entertain constitutional challenges to
citizenship statutes in Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-Villar is evidence that
the plenary power is no longer a barrier to constitutional review of all
questions immigration-related.197 Despite this development in the
constitutional analysis of immigration statutes, naturalization remains
firmly imbedded in Congress’s plenary power.198
4.

Immigration policy distinctions
The fourth category of cases where deference to Congress’s plenary
power has been nearly absolute consists of challenges to Congress’s
policy choices distinguishing among aliens for the purposes of
federal benefits or immigration preference classifications.
Challenges in this category involve Congress’s policy decisions to
extend benefits to some but not all foreign nationals.199 The Court in
Mathews characterized these congressional decisions not as
constitutional issues but as policy choices where Congress must draw
a line in the allocation of benefits to aliens.200 The Mathews Court
thus justified residency requirements for federal benefits, noting that
those who fall just to one side of the line will always have cause to

195. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 936–37 (describing the steadily accumulating
case law demonstrating courts’ inventive exceptions and qualifications to the plenary
power doctrine).
196. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96–97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that plenary power deference only applies when a person is an alien, not
when determining the person’s status for purposes of constitutional protection); see
also supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s logically prior analysis).
197. Compare Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60 (engaging in equal protection analysis of a
citizenship statute), and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that Congress’s
plenary power is “subject to important constitutional limitations,” particularly that of
procedural due process during removal), with Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–13
(concluding that Congress’s absolute power to exclude and expel aliens precluded
judicial review), and Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)
(showing that the plenary power was an absolute bar to concluding that Congress’s
legislation in immigration, the Chinese Exclusion Act, was unconstitutional).
198. See, e.g., Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (acknowledging that
Congress’s broad power over naturalization and immigration allows for rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to U.S. citizens).
199. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799–800 (1977) (holding that Congress’s
decision not to extend preferential status to the illegitimate children of U.S. citizen
fathers was constitutional); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (upholding
residency requirements for eligibility for federal Medicare benefits).
200. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81–83 (upholding a five-year residency requirement
to obtain permanent resident status).
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complain.201 In the case of preference category classifications for
immigrant visas, the Court has made similar references to Congress’s
authority to make policy choices distinguishing among eligible
aliens.202 For instance, the Fiallo Court looked to legislative history to
determine that Congress made an explicit policy choice not to
extend preferential status to all aliens, and thus that Congress’s
decision was insulated from judicial review.203
In summary, small variations in the level of judicial review exist
even in these four areas of recognized plenary power: admission,
removal, naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions. As the
Court’s precedent demonstrates, Congress’s plenary power is at its
zenith and may wholly preclude judicial scrutiny in questions of
admission. In contrast, the plenary power doctrine permits limited
judicial review in cases of removal, naturalization, and policy choices.
While these categories are themselves quite broad, employing this
limited substantive framework of plenary power case law will allow
courts to recognize when immigration-related questions do not fall
within the plenary power’s scope. This nuanced approach will permit
courts to apply non-deferential standards in constitutional challenges
to immigration statutes when the issue is beyond the scope of the
plenary power doctrine.
B. DOMA Does Not Apply to Immigrant Visa Petitions Through Congress’s
Plenary Power Over Admission, Removal, or Naturalization
A petition for immediate relative classification for a same-sex
spouse is not an issue of naturalization or removal.204 Thus, if plenary
power deference were to reach this stage of the immigration process,
it would be through Congress’s authority over decisions of admission
or policy distinctions.205 This Comment argues that by employing the
accepted understanding of the difference between visa petitions and
admission, along with Justice O’Connor’s nuanced approach to the
plenary power’s scope in her dissent in Nguyen, the visa petition stage
of the immigration process is beyond the plenary power’s scope.
Furthermore, Congress did not intend to make a rule for admission

201. Id. at 83.
202. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798 (stating that the issue of which aliens receive
preferential status is a policy question entrusted to the political branches).
203. See id. at 799 n.9 (noting that the challenged distinction was addressed in a
prior bill proposed in Congress); infra Part II.C (discussing the policy choice at issue
in Fiallo).
204. See supra notes 28–29 (explaining naturalization and removal).
205. See supra note 27 (defining admission); see also supra Part II.A.4 (explaining
Congress’s plenary power in immigration policy).
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or a policy choice in immigration when it enacted DOMA. Thus, the
plenary power cannot shield DOMA’s application in immigration
from traditional constitutional review.
1.

Immigrant visa classification versus admission
In order to establish an immediate relative relationship with a
foreign national spouse, a U.S. citizen must file USCIS Form I-130.206
Once this relationship is established and the I-130 petition is
approved, a visa for the foreign national spouse is immediately
available pending the approval of an immigrant visa application.207
The I-130 petition and immigrant visa portions of the process are
necessary precursors to the foreign national’s admission or
adjustment of status;208 however, determining a foreign national’s
eligibility for an immigrant visa classification on a form I-130 is
distinct from a decision of admission.
The BIA has recognized the distinction between admissibility and
adjudication of a visa petition. For example, in a case before the BIA
in 1959,209 a U.S. citizen petitioned for quota-exempt status on behalf
of her foreign national spouse.210 Her spouse, however, had
numerous criminal and fraud issues that would have rendered him
excludable— or inadmissible, as the modern terminology would
describe him.211 U.S. immigration authorities sought to deny the
foreign national’s visa petition on the grounds that he would
ultimately be found inadmissible, and thus ineligible for a visa.212
The BIA found that because the visa petition established the requisite
immediate relative relationship and U.S. citizenship of the foreign
national’s spouse, the visa petition should be approved
notwithstanding the admissibility issues.213 The BIA reasoned that the
“sole concern for the [visa petition] procedure is eligibility for the
status claimed” and that a review of admissibility is left for a consular
or immigration service officer at the immigrant visa or adjustment of
status stage.214 Maintaining that this distinction safeguards the
foreign national’s opportunity for a hearing on his admission in front

206. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1996); see supra Part I.B (discussing the general filing and
adjudication procedures for the immediate relative classification).
207. See INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006) (stating that immediate relatives
are quota-exempt).
208. Id. § 201(b).
209. O —, 8 I. & N. Dec. 295 (B.I.A. 1959).
210. Id. at 295.
211. Id. at 296.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 297.
214. Id.
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of a consular or immigration service officer, the BIA concluded that
approval of a visa petition does not guarantee admission and that the
two steps are necessarily distinct.215
The INA’s statutory scheme governing admissibility reinforces the
distinction between admission and eligibility for immediate relative
visa classification. Section 212 of the INA contains the grounds of
inadmissibility, ranging from public health concerns to terrorist
activity.216 This section states that a foreign national is inadmissible if
she does not have a valid and unexpired immigrant visa.217 Section
212 does not state that ineligibility for an immigrant visa renders a
foreign national inadmissible.218 Moreover, the factors and rules for
adjudicating an I-130 petition based on a marital relationship with a
U.S. citizen are contained in section 204 of the INA, separate and
distinct from the section governing inadmissibility.219 Thus, while
section 212 establishes that a valid immigrant visa is necessary for a
determination of admissibility, adjudication of an immigrant visa
petition is statutorily distinct from admissibility.220
To seek admission as an immigrant, a foreign national must
establish her eligibility for the given visa classification and obtain the
visa.221 These steps are necessary precursors to admission and are
distinct from an immigration officer’s decision to admit a particular
foreign national.222
2.

Admission and Justice O’Connor’s logically prior standard for the plenary
power’s scope
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance on the precise
boundaries of the plenary power doctrine, Justice O’Connor’s dissent
in Nguyen provides a useful standard for defining the plenary power’s
scope. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggested that steps
logically prior to admission may not be subject to plenary power
deference.223 Justice O’Connor attempted to distinguish between
215. See id. at 297–98 (approving visa petition but warning that the approval did
not assure admission to the United States).
216. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).
217. Id. § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(l).
218. Id. § 212.
219. Id. § 204.
220. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0012, PETITION
FOR ALIEN RELATIVE (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i130.pdf (containing questions regarding the citizenship of the petitioning spouse
and the facts of the qualifying relationship but not questions of admissibility).
221. See INA § 101 (classifying an alien without a valid visa as inadmissible).
222. See supra Part I.B (detailing the distinct steps in the process for seeking
admission as an immigrant).
223. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
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naturalization⎯over which Congress’s plenary power is firmly
established⎯and a determination of whether a foreign national is a
U.S. citizen.224 Her dissent argued that a case must be within the
boundaries of the plenary power’s scope in order to receive
Employing this reasoning, eligibility for a visa
deference.225
classification can also be characterized as a step logically prior to
admission.226 Just as determining whether an individual is a citizen is
a step logically prior to naturalization, determining whether an
individual is an immediate relative⎯a spouse in the case of
DOMA⎯is a step logically prior to admission.227 As Justice O’Connor
concluded in the citizenship question in Nguyen,228 the ordinary
standards of constitutional analysis should thus apply to challenges to
DOMA’s application in the I-130 visa petition process.
Justice O’Connor is not the first Supreme Court justice to suggest a
substantive limitation on plenary power. In his dissent to Miller,
Justice Breyer stated that conferral of citizenship at birth was distinct
from naturalization⎯an area of the law over which Congress has
plenary power.229 Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller and Justice
O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggest that arguments attempting to
narrow the plenary power doctrine’s scope are reoccurring in the
Court’s modern plenary power jurisprudence.230 With the Court’s
avoidance of the plenary power question in Miller, Nguyen, and FloresVillar, Justice O’Connor advanced one potential understanding of the
plenary power’s scope.231 While the majority has yet to adopt Justice
O’Connor’s logically prior standard, the equally divided decision to
affirm Flores-Villar could be evidence that the Court continues to
disagree on the plenary power’s scope in immigration cases, even
after Justice O’Connor’s retirement from the Court in 2006.232 If the

that a predicate to applying Fiallo-style deference is that the individuals involved are
in fact aliens).
224. Id. at 96.
225. Id.
226. See supra Part II.B.1 (establishing that a visa petition is a distinct prior step to
admission).
227. See supra Parts I.B and II.B.1 (discussing the immediate relative
determination in the immigration process and establishing that it is a precursor to
admission).
228. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
229. Miller, 523 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230. See supra note 139 (addressing dissenting opinions that attempted to narrow
the scope of the plenary power).
231. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
232. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam); see supra
Part I.A.3 (discussing the Ninth Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Flores-Villar).
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Court accepts the distinctions between naturalization and the steps
logically prior, or between naturalization and citizenship at birth, it
could also recognize the distinction between admission and the
logically prior question of immigrant visa classification eligibility.233
Distinguishing between admission and the logically prior step of
assessing the qualifying relationship for purposes of an immigrant
visa petition would require confronting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Fiallo. The Court in Fiallo upheld a statute governing eligibility for
preferential status for an immigrant visa by citing Congress’s plenary
power over the admission of foreign nationals.234 While Congress’s
plenary power over admission is firmly established,235 the Court has
also long accepted that admission and establishing the necessary
qualifying relationship for preferential status are separate and distinct
considerations.236 Moreover, the Court decided Fiallo during the era
of evolving equal protection standards and prior to the Court’s
willingness to scrutinize equal protection challenges in
immigration.237 Thus, the Court’s conflation of visa petition eligibility
and admission in Fiallo may be another example of the dangers of the
poorly defined plenary power.
While plenary power precedent is formidable, it no longer serves as
a barrier to the distinctions in immigration law that may narrow its
scope and influence. In the formative years of the Supreme Court’s
plenary power jurisprudence, the Court interpreted the doctrine to
be a strict limitation on judicial review, often foreclosing thoughtful
analysis of constitutional questions in cases involving immigration.238
In Galvan v. Press, the Court acknowledged the due process
limitations on the plenary power’s reach,239 and later, in Zadvydas, the
Court explicitly recognized the constitutional limitations of the
plenary power doctrine in cases of removal.240 In the past two
233. But see Legomsky, supra note 34, at 298 (“The distinction between
distinctions would either swallow the plenary power doctrine entirely or give the
courts an unfettered discretion whether to invoke it.”).
234. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798–99 (1977).
235. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the broad deference afforded to Congress in
the admission of foreign nationals).
236. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing BIA precedent separating the adjudication of
immigrant visa petitions and decisions of admissibility as well as the distinct statutory
schemes governing the two steps of the immigration process).
237. See supra Parts I.A.2–3 (emphasizing the importance of evolving equal
protection standards to the subsequent developments in the constitutional analysis of
immigration statutes).
238. See supra Part I.A.1 (analyzing the Court’s avoidance of constitutional
questions in early plenary power cases).
239. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the Court’s limited recognition of an alien’s
procedural due process safeguards).
240. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 695 (2001) (construing an
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decades, and with the recent decision to affirm Flores-Villar, the Court
has grappled with the possibility of distinctions in immigration
statutes involving naturalization that may further narrow the plenary
power’s scope.241 Thus, the Court could also apply the lessons of the
plenary power’s constitutional limitations and the distinctions
possible within immigration law to cases involving admission.242
Given the volume of the plenary power’s history, it is unlikely that
this evolution marks the death of the plenary power.243 It does,
however, signify that with the increasing knowledge of the
complexities of immigration law and the evolution of constitutional
standards of review, questions relating to immigration are emerging
where the plenary power may no longer be an appropriate
justification.244 A determination of immigrant visa eligibility is a step
logically prior to admission and is thus beyond the plenary power’s
scope.
C. DOMA Is Not a Result of Congress’s Immigration Policy Goals
In light of the plenary power precedent, Congress could arguably
make a policy choice to explicitly ban the admission of whomever it
wants, including homosexuals.245 Such a ban would, however, be
subject to the facially legitimate and bona fide standard of plenary
power cases and it is not unlikely that a ban on the admission of
homosexuals would fail even this relaxed standard.246 Although a ban
immigration statute to comply with constitutional protections); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (arguing that Justice Breyer’s use of the phrase
“subject to important constitutional limitations” in Zadvydas “may represent a
radical shift, a turning point for immigration law”).
241. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the disagreement on the Court over whether
naturalization could be distinguished from the question of determining whether an
alien was a citizen).
242. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 926 (noting that the “precise degree of . . .
deference [to Congress] has varied with both the context and the era”).
243. See supra Part I.A (elaborating on the plenary power’s scope and
development). But see Spiro, supra note 104, at 339 (contending that the Supreme
Court’s constitutional analysis in Nguyen and Zadvydas forecasts the demise of the
plenary power doctrine).
244. See Motomura, supra note 34, at 565 (maintaining that once the immigration
inquiry is expanded “to include the more general law of aliens’ rights . . . the force
of the plenary power doctrine diminishes considerably” and courts often adopt
approaches that are in conflict with the plenary power doctrine).
245. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120–22 (1967) (affirming the exclusion of a
homosexual foreign national because Congress intended the ground of
inadmissibility for those “afflicted with psychopathic personality” to exclude
homosexuals); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that even if the immigration policy reflects a
cruel prejudice or “offend[s] American traditions,” it is the prerogative of
Congress).
246. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (explaining that the
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on admission may offend constitutional principles, the Supreme
Court has recognized that in its broad power over immigration,
“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
In fact, Congress sought to exclude
applied to citizens.” 247
homosexuals with the 1952 INA and bolstered that exclusion when it
amended the INA in 1965 to deny admission to those “afflicted with
sexual deviation.” 248
DOMA, however, is readily distinguishable from Congress’s past
explicit policy choice to prevent the admission of homosexuals.
DOMA was not the product of Congress legislating in immigration,
and while it has provided a lens through which executive branch
officers interpret the INA, it did not amend the INA itself.249
Moreover, the 1990 reform of the INA repealed Congress’s explicit
ban on homosexual admission,250 depriving DOMA of any statutory
basis for imposing a practical ban on admission.251
Unlike most of the statutes confronted by the courts in establishing
the plenary power precedent,252 DOMA was not aimed specifically at
immigration and is not an expression of Congress’s policy
distinguishing among aliens for the purposes of federal benefits.253
In Mathews, the Supreme Court decided that Congress could
constitutionally distinguish among aliens based on years of residency

departure from Bowers was justified by an “emerging awareness” in the latter half of
the twentieth century that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); see also Gill
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (concluding that
DOMA’s treatment of same-sex marriage lacks any rational basis because it is not
“directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective”), aff’d sub nom.
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
247. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–80 (1976) (stating that aliens are not
entitled to all the advantages of citizenship and that Congress treating aliens
differently from citizens is not necessarily “invidious”).
248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, FAMILY, UNVALUED:
DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S.
LAW 24–25 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
FamilyUnvalued.pdf (describing Congress’s intention to ban the admission of
homosexuals with the 1952 amendments to the INA by excluding “aliens afflicted
with psychopathic personality, epilepsy or mental defect”).
249. See supra Part I.B (explaining Congress’s aims in passing DOMA).
250. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, supra note 248, at 28.
251. See INA §§ 212, 237, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2006) (making no reference to
homosexuality as a ground for inadmissibility or removability).
252. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57–58 (2001) (involving a challenge to a
provision in the INA); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 789 (1977) (same); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889) (involving a challenge to Congress’s
immigration legislation with the Chinese Exclusion Act).
253. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (emphasizing that the question
facing the Court was not one of aliens versus citizens in the eligibility for federal
benefits, but rather a question of whether distinctions can be drawn within a class of
aliens so that some are eligible for benefits while others are not).

PORTMESS.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

8/27/2012 12:22 PM

1860

[Vol. 61:1825

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

for purposes of eligibility for federal benefits.254 In the DOMA
context, however, the basis for the distinction is the nature of the
marital relationship.255
While Congress may have relatively
unfettered power to make policy choices distinguishing among
aliens,256 the difference between a distinction based on years of
residency and a distinction based on the nature of a marital
relationship⎯which is likely to invoke the Court’s precedent
involving the fundamental right to marry⎯requires a thoughtful
analysis of the constitutional issues at stake.257
Unlike DOMA, the statute upheld in Fiallo precluded recognition
of a particular relationship expressly for the purposes of immigrant
visa eligibility.258 The challenged statute was a provision of the INA
barring illegitimate children from qualifying for a non-quota
preference category based on a relationship with a U.S. citizen
natural father.259 After analyzing the INA and legislative history of
this exclusionary bar, the Court concluded that preferential status
should not be extended to illegitimate children and their natural
fathers.260 The Court reasoned that because Congress amended the
INA to recognize the relationship between an illegitimate child and a
U.S. citizen natural mother for preferential status, but had
intentionally refused to extend this status to U.S. citizen natural
fathers, Congress’s policy choice was clear.261 Unlike the challenged
statutory provision in Fiallo, the legislative history of DOMA does not
focus on immigration statutes or DOMA’s effect in immigration.262
More importantly, the legislative history of DOMA does not indicate
that Congress expressly intended to distinguish among the class of

254. Id. at 83.
255. See supra Part I.B (explaining DOMA’s effect in immigration).
256. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (recognizing the “limited scope of judicial inquiry”
in Congress’s policy choices involving admission).
257. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (insisting that “[m]arriage is one
of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival”
(citation omitted)); see also Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA:
How Immigration Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 455,
465 (2008) (arguing that DOMA’s application in immigration infringes on the
fundamental right to “make decisions related to marriage”).
258. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799–800; see also supra Part II.C (explaining the Court’s
reasoning in Fiallo).
259. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799–800.
260. Id. at 797, 799–800.
261. Id. at 797.
262. See supra Part I.B (discussing DOMA’s passage); see also Scott Titshaw, A
Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & Etc.: Immigration Law the Defense
of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 446–52,
466–67 (2011) (discussing DOMA’s limited legislative history and indicating that
Congress was aware of DOMA’s immigration consequences even though immigration
was not a focus during DOMA’s passage).
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foreign nationals by extending the immediate relative classification to
heterosexual couples but not same-sex couples.263 Moreover, DOMA
did not necessitate a change in the INA because “child” and
“parent” are explicitly defined in the INA264 but “marriage” is not.265
Thus, DOMA cannot be defended as Congress’s policy choice in
immigration.
Accordingly, Congress’s plenary power in immigration policy
decisions cannot insulate DOMA from traditional constitutional
review. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s power to
make policy choices in immigration as inherent to its plenary power
in immigration. DOMA, however, was neither a result of Congress’s
policy making in immigration nor an explicit practical decision to
extend a benefit to some classes of foreign nationals but not others.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DOMA’S APPLICATION IN
IMMIGRATION SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS OF REVIEW BECAUSE CONGRESS DID NOT ENACT DOMA
USING ITS PLENARY POWER
Even though DOMA influences the immigration process, Congress
did not enact DOMA using its immigration authority. Thus, judicial
review of DOMA’s effect in immigration should not be limited to the
deferential constitutional standards applied in plenary power cases.266
If the plenary power doctrine is narrowed such that DOMA’s
application in immigration falls outside the plenary power’s scope,
the level of scrutiny that would apply to a constitutional challenge to
DOMA in the immigration context, like the fate of DOMA itself, is
not entirely clear.267
263. See supra Part I.B (discussing DOMA’s legislative history).
264. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
265. See supra Part I.B (discussing how marriage is defined in immigration law).
266. Although Congress arguably did not enact DOMA using its immigration and
naturalization authority, DOMA may apply to the immigration context as a public
policy exception to marriage recognition. See supra Part I.B (discussing public policy
exceptions in marriage recognition). The reconciliation of general rules of marriage
recognition and federal public policy exceptions exemplifies the tension between the
federal and state powers to define marriage under the Constitution’s Full Faith and
Credit Clause⎯a conflict at the heart of the DOMA debate. This conflict is beyond
the scope of this Comment; it is sufficient to differentiate between Congress’s
plenary power to legislate in immigration and its authority to assert a public policy
exception to marriage recognition. Unlike the plenary power doctrine, a public
policy exception does not prohibit or influence judicial review. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (concluding that a state public policy exception
foreclosing recognition of interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth
Amendment). See generally Titshaw, supra note 6, at 579–93 (discussing federal public
policy exceptions to marriage recognition).
267. See Mark Strasser, What if DOMA were Repealed? The Confused and Confusing
Interstate Marriage Recognition Jurisprudence, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249, 249 (2010)
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When legislation involves foreign nationals, but was not enacted
under Congress’s immigration or naturalization authority, the
Supreme Court has recognized that traditional equal protection
standards apply.268 Moreover, the INA, which contains a number of
restrictions and limitations on judicial review of immigration
decisions,269 does not prohibit a constitutional challenge to DOMA in
the immigration context. The INA explicitly states that none of its
provisions “shall be construed to preclude review of constitutional
claims.” 270
Since Congress did not enact DOMA using its
immigration or naturalization power, a constitutional challenge to
DOMA’s discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
immigration context should be scrutinized like any other alleged
equal protection violation.
Although DOMA can be distinguished from immigration law’s
apparent exceptionalism in constitutional analysis, the scrutiny
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation in the
traditional equal protection framework is unsettled.271
In his
February 23, 2011 letter to Congress, Attorney General Holder stated
that President Obama has determined that DOMA’s federal
definition of marriage, as applied to same-sex couples legally married
under state law, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.272
In reaching this determination, the President
(arguing that it is unclear whether a “state would have the power to refuse to
recognize a [same-sex] marriage valid . . . in another state” in the absence of
DOMA); Titshaw, supra note 6, at 537 (doubting that a repeal of DOMA would
“result in a clear, uniform rule recognizing all same-sex marriages” in immigration
because of the INA’s lack of clarity).
268. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 374 (1886) (stating that the
provisions of the Equal Protection Clause are “universal in their application” and
concluding that a city ordinance, which discriminated against a class of immigrants,
was unconstitutional); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (stating that an
alien is a “person” for the purposes of constitutional protections, whatever his status
under the immigration laws). But see Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that the INA’s denial of visa preference to same-sex spouses
was constitutional in light of the INA’s then explicit bar on homosexual admission).
269. See INA § 242 (outlining the myriad limits on judicial review of immigration
decisions under the INA).
270. Id. § 242(a)(2)(D); cf. id. § 202(a)(1)(A) (containing a clause prohibiting
discrimination based on “race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence”
but not sexual orientation in the issuance of immigrant visas).
271. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that
homosexuals are not a suspect class and that classifications based on sexual
orientation do not warrant heightened scrutiny); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning,
455 F.3d 859, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124
F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). But see Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA fails rational basis review
and violates equal protection), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
272. Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13.

PORTMESS.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

UNTIL THE PLENARY POWER DO US PART

8/27/2012 12:22 PM

1863

concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny and that DOMA would
Attorney General Holder thus
fail to meet this standard.273
announced to Congress that the executive branch would not defend
DOMA in federal court cases challenging its constitutionality.274 This
announcement, while arguably a victory for DOMA’s opponents, does
not affect the adjudication of binational same-sex couples’ petitions
for immigration benefits because the Attorney General also stated
that the executive branch would continue to enforce DOMA outside
of the courtroom.275
Additionally, the Supreme Court has not ruled that classifications
based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny. The
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans276 applied rational basis review to
invalidate a state statute that encouraged discrimination based on
sexual orientation,277 and the Court has since avoided the question of
whether claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation warrant
heightened scrutiny.278 Many federal circuit courts of appeals have
also declined to extend heightened scrutiny to classifications based
on sexual orientation.279 Moreover, some scholars argue that
DOMA’s interference with the marital decisions of U.S. citizens
infringes on a fundamental right and thus is subject to strict
scrutiny.280 The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to
frame immigration questions in terms of the rights of affected U.S.
citizens.281
In addition to equal protection concerns, opponents have
criticized Congress for exceeding its power in domestic relations by
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
277. Id. at 635.
278. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (focusing on the right to privacy
and due process instead of the issue of what level of scrutiny applies to classifications
based on sexual orientation).
279. See supra note 271 (illustrating in several cases that homosexuals are not a
suspect class and warrant only rational basis review).
280. See Pinix, supra note 257, at 458 (arguing that DOMA infringes on the
fundamental rights of U.S. citizens and that equal protection “trumps” the plenary
power doctrine); Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”: The Judicial Duty to Heighten
Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same Sex Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 711
(2009) (advocating for heightened scrutiny and less deference to Congress’s plenary
power because DOMA affects the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens).
281. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977) (concluding that immigration
policy decisions are entrusted exclusively to the political branches, regardless of the
effects of these decisions on the rights of U.S. citizens); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (refusing to frame the question as whether a
benefit extended to a U.S. citizen can be revoked without a hearing and instead
focusing on whether an alien has a right to admission).
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enacting DOMA.282 At a July 2011 hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the impact of DOMA, Senator Dianne
Feinstein, an ardent opponent of DOMA, argued that the Act is the
single exception to a traditional legal scheme that has left marriage,
divorce, adoption, and inheritance rights to the states.283 In a variety
of contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized the general rule that
domestic relations are the prerogative of state and not federal law.284
Thus, whether the federal government can define the spousal
relationship is at the heart of the DOMA debate.285 To allow
Congress to do so in immigration simply because of the field’s legal
exceptionalism would ignore the fact that this debate is unsettled.
Much remains undecided in both the specific constitutional
scrutiny of DOMA and the general role of constitutional review in
immigration law. After the Attorney General’s February 2011 letter,
binational same-sex couples in immigration proceedings may find
their cases closed or placed on hold,286 while same-sex couples
petitioning for immigration benefits will likely be denied
altogether.287 This confusion leaves foreign nationals, like Paul
Wilson Dorman, in a legal limbo. As this situation develops,
abandoning the plenary power justification for DOMA should at least
allow courts to apply traditional constitutional standards of
review⎯whatever those standards may ultimately be⎯rather than the
deferential or diluted standards employed in modern plenary power

282. See The Respect for Marriage Act: Assessing the Impact of DOMA on American
Families: Hearing on S. 589 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011)
[hereinafter Respect for Marriage Act Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein)
(noting her disagreement with the policy); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (deciding that DOMA raises
federalism concerns by regulating an area customarily left to states’ discretion).
283. See Respect for Marriage Act Hearing, supra note 282, at 3 (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein) (insisting that the determination of marriage rights remain the
“preserve of State law”).
284. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997) (recognizing that state domestic
relation orders regarding community property interests of separated or divorced
spouses and their children are matters for state law and are not preempted by federal
statutes); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing, in the context of parental rights, that the area of domestic
relations “has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good
reason”).
285. Cf. Pinix, supra note 257, at 464 (asserting that the Court has frequently
struck down regulations that restrict marriage because the Constitution protects
marriage decisions).
286. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing immigration courts’
hesitation to strictly enforce DOMA despite immigration courts and the BIA being
bureaus or agencies for the purposes of DOMA’s federal definition).
287. See ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 158 (advising adjudicators to
deny the visa petitions of same-sex partners).
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cases.288
CONCLUSION
Immigration cases since the 1970s indicate that the plenary power
is no longer an unqualified barrier to judicial review. Rather than
acting as a bulwark against judicial review, the plenary power doctrine
should be interpreted narrowly and its limited application recognized
in light of the myriad complexities in immigration law. A limited
substantive framework for the plenary power’s scope is possible, and
plenary power case law suggests that not all political branch decisions
involving immigration can be insulated from traditional standards of
judicial review. The Supreme Court should recognize the limits of
the plenary power rather than avoid the doctrine the next time it
grants certiorari to a case in the unsettled line of Miller, Nguyen, and
Flores-Villar challenges. If the Court adopts a nuanced plenary power
framework, DOMA’s application in immigration may fall outside the
scope of that power.
With the Supreme Court’s failure to confront the plenary power
doctrine in Flores-Villar, constitutional jurisprudence in immigration
remains a field mired with complexities and exceptions. Until the
Supreme Court confronts DOMA’s constitutionality or Congress
repeals the Act, the fate of binational same-sex couples like Paul
Wilson Dorman and his spouse remains undecided. By freeing
DOMA’s application in immigration from the plenary power
justification, the conversation on DOMA’s constitutionality can
include its immigration consequences.

288. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the constitutional standards applied in
modern plenary power case law).

